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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION- SUSPECT CLASSIFICA-
TION-ILLEGITIMACY-INTESTATE SUCCESSION-The United States
Supreme Court has held a state intestate succession statute which
denies illegitimate children the right to inherit from their father's
estate to be a violation of equal protection.
Trim ble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
Deta Mona Trimble, the illegitimate but openly acknowledged'
daughter of an intestate father, was excluded from participation in
her father's estate' by the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois. The court relied upon section 12 of the Illinois
Probate Code' which allows illegitimate children to inherit by intes-
tate succession from their mothers but impliedly refuses such a right
in the estate of their fathers. Legitimate children, however, may
inherit by intestate succession from both their mothers and fathers
under Illinois law.4
Deta Mona and her mother sought review of the circuit court's
decision, alleging that section 12 violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment by invidiously discriminating
on the basis of illegitimacy. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed
direct appeal and, in an oral opinion delivered from the bench,
rejected appellant's constitutional challenges' on the basis of an
earlier state decision, In re Estate of Karas,I and on authority of the
1. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, had entered a paternity
order declaring the deceased, Sherman Gordon, to be the father of Deta Mona Trimble, and
ordered Gordon to pay $15 per week for her support. He complied with the order and openly
acknowledged her as his child. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977).
2. The court determined Gordon's father, mother, brother, two sisters, and half-brother
to be the heirs of the estate. The estate consisted of a 1974 Plymouth valued at $2,500. Id.
3. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961). The Probate Act of 1975 repealed § 12
as of January 1, 1976 and replaced it with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978). However, the part. of § 12 at issue here has not been materially altered by § 2-2 and
the courts continued to refer to the provision as § 12. The statute now provides:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and of any
person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of
an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take by descent any estate which
the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents
intermarry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
5. See 430 U.S. at 765.
6. 61111. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). The court in Karas sustained the constitutionality
of § 12 against all constitutional challenges including those presented in an amicus brief filed
by the appellants in Trimble. 430 U.S. at 765.
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Supreme Court's decision in Labine v. Vincent.' The United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction8 to consider the consti-
tutionality of the statutory classification.9 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court reversed, holding that the legitimacy distinction for intestate
succession violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."' In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the
statutory justifications for discriminating against illegitimates set
forth in Labine, and relied upon by the Illinois court, of promoting
legitimate family relationships, of providing efficient methods of
property disposition, and the absence of an "insurmountable bar-
rier."I'
Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, held that a classifica-
tion based on illegitimacy was not generally a "suspect" classifica-
tion which required the Court's most exacting scrutiny." Although
the personal attributes of illegitimacy are similar to those which
have been held to be suspect, the analogy was insufficient to require
strict scrutiny. 3 Nevertheless, the majority required more than just
the promulgation of some legitimate state purpose: the statutory
classification must, at the very least, bear a rational relationship to
the state aim in order to withstand the constitutional challenges of
the equal protection clause. 4 Thus, focusing on the reasoning of the
7. 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (intestate succession law barring illegitimate children from sharing
equally with legitimate children in father's estate is within state's power to establish rules
for protection of family life and for disposition of property).
8. 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
9. Although appellant contended below that § 12 also discriminated on the basis of race
and sex, the Court did not reach this argument. 430 U.S. at 765 & n.10.
10. Id. at 776.
11. See notes 12-32 and accompanying text infra. The Court also refused to sustain the
constitutionality of § 12 on the theory that the Illinois Probate Act mirrored the presumed
intentions of the citizens as to the disposition of their property at death. This argument was
not relied upon by the Illinois Supreme Court as a legitimate state purpose after a detailed
examination of the history and text of § 12. The Supreme Court declined to review any
additional purpose ignored by the highest court in the state. 430 U.S. at 774-76.
12. 430 U.S. at 767. Under equal protection analysis, certain classifications which involve
sensitive and fundamental personal rights, such as those based on race or national origin,
have been held by the Court to be "suspect," requiring the most rigid scrutiny and a
compelling governmental interest as justification. This standard of strict review is an excep-
tion to the general standard that a statutory classification is constitutionally valid as long as
it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. See generally Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969). See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976) (Court rejected the argument that classifications based on illegitimacy are
"suspect").
13. 430 U.S. at 767 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 505-06).
14. 430 U.S. at 766. The Court applied the standard set forth in previous decisions involv-
Recent Decisions
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Karas,'5 the Court asked whether
section 12 was a valid means of promoting the purported state inter-
ests of encouraging legitimate family relationships and providing an
efficient method of property disposal."6
Justice Powell recalled that the Supreme Court in Labine v.
Vincent'7 had held that a state's interest in promoting legitimate
family relationships was an acceptable justification for a classifica-
tion based on illegitimacy." Here, however, the majority believed
the state court inappropriately relied on Labine without a complete
constitutional analysis of the statute's justification and its rational
relationship to the state purpose. 9 The majority declared that sec-
tion 12 could bear, at best, only a minimal relationship to the pro-
motion of legitimate families.20 Such an attempt by the state to
influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions or
disabilities on their illegitimate children was seen to be not only
ineffectual2' but contrary to our system of justice.2 2 Only the par-
ents, the majority stated, have the ability to conform their conduct
to the norms of society and any children of illegitimate relationships
are powerless to change either their parent's actions or their own
status. Further, it is inherent in our system of justice that legal
burdens must bear some relationship to the individual wrongdoers.
Since a child can in no way be responsible for his illegitimacy, the
ing the constitutionality of classifications based on illegitimacy. See note 12 supra. See also
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)(illegitimacy distinction in workmen's
compensation statutes held unconstitutional where classification bore no significant relation
to statutory purposes).
15. 61 Ill. 2d at 48, 329 N.E.2d at 238.
16. 430 U.S. at 768.
17. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
18. 430 U.S. at 768. The Labine decision overruled constitutional challenges to Louis-
iana's intestate succession laws that barred illegitimate children from sharing equally with
legitimate children in their father's estate, holding the statutory scheme to be within the state
power to establish rules for the protection and strengthening of family life and for disposition
of property. 401 U.S. at 535,40.19. 430 U.S. at 769. The Court indicated that the Labine opinion also contained only a
superficial equal protection analysis. As a result, Labine was not in line with other equal
protection decisions and has been limited as a precedent in subsequent decisions. See id. at
767 n.12, 768.
20. Id. at 768-69.
21. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972) (Court rejected the
argument that "persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap
the benefits of workmen's compensation").
22. 406 U.S. at 175.
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Court found it unjust to penalize the child by imposing the disabili-
ties upon him.23
Secondly, Justice Powell rejected the state's concern in establish-
ing an orderly method of property disposition as a valid justification
for the statute. 4 Although the majority acknowledged the state's
problems in proving paternity and preventing spurious claims, such
difficulties, the Court believed, did not justify total statutory disin-
heritance.15 Unlike the Illinois court, which failed to consider a mid-
dle ground between complete exclusion and a case by case approach
to the proof of paternity, the Court found that there were some
categories of illegitimate children whose inheritance rights could be
recognized without upsetting an efficient disposition of property. 6
When a man is found to be the father through a paternity action
and ordered to support the child-as in Deta Mona's case, for exam-
ple-such a state adjudication should be sufficient to allow a share
in the estate since it would not adversely affect state interests."
Thus, in the opinion of the Court, the statute was flawed in not
carefully considering these alternatives," thereby extending far be-
yond the needs of any purported state purpose. 9
Finally, the majority rejected the Illinois court's reliance on
Labine to conclude that because there was no "insurmountable bar-
rier" preventing an illegitimate child from sharing in her father's
estate, section 12 was constitutionally sufficient.'" Although there
23. 430 U.S. at 769-70.
24. Id. at 772.
25. Id. See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (problems of proof of paternity
cannot be an impenetrable barrier to shield discriminatory statutes denying paternal support
to illegitimate children).
26. 430 U.S. at 770-71.
27. Id. at 772.
28. See id. at 772 n.14. The majority was careful to limit the holding to only those forms
of proof, such as a prior adjudication or formal acknowledgement of paternity, which do not
compromise the state's interest.
29. Id. at 772. See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (statutory classifications
in the Social Security Act based on illegitimacy were upheld primarily because the statute
did not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates but was careful to consider
alternatives to total exclusion of illegitimates); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637
(1974) (Social Security Act benefitting illegitimates without any showing of dependency upon
disabled parent held violation of equal protection as statutory definitions are "overinclusive"
in that it benefits some legitimated but nondependent children and at the same time excludes
some legitimates who are dependent).
30. 61 111. 2d at 52, 329 N.E.2d at 240. The decedents in Karas and Trimble could have
left substantial parts of their estates to their illegitimate children by writing a will. Thus,




had been a focus on available alternatives and the existence or
absence of an "insurmountable barrier" in earlier decisions by the
Court,"1 the majority now rejected it as being an analytical anomaly.
In an equal protection analysis, the Court found its only task to be
a determination of whether the statutory classification was justified
by a rational relationship with the promotion of legitimate state
objectives. By focusing on possible alternatives of the father, the
Court would lose sight of this essential question. The Court refused
to avoid the question by a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts which
would destroy any discrimination against the appellant and held
that available alternatives have no constitutional significance."
Four Justices dissented,3 claiming Trimble to be indistin-
guishable from Labine v. Vincent. Justice Rehnquist, however, filed
an additional opinion further denouncing the analysis of the case
offered by the majority. 4 Dissatisfied with the Court's confusion
and inconsistency on the equal protection clause," Rehnquist con-
cluded that the majority in Trimble had, as many courts before,
read too much into the clause. The fourteenth amendment was a
Civil War amendment and had to be considered in the context of
the war fought immediately before its passage. Although the dissent
acknowledged that the amendment severely modified the constitu-
tional balance between state and federal governments by giving the
Supreme Court the power to strike down state laws which directly
violated the fourteenth amendment, 3 Rehnquist reminded the ma-
31. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972) (no alternatives
available to modify child's position as illegitimate); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 539 (no
insurmountable barrier prevented illegitimate from sharing in estate).
32. 430 U.S. at 773-74. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (no indication that
available alternatives have constitutional significance).
33. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist filed a dissent-
ing statement.
34. 430 U.S. at 777.
35. Rehnquist noted that since the adoption of the equal protection clause, the Court has
been unable to formulate a consistent doctrine which reasonably expounds the intent of those
who drafted the clause. Further, even if the framers had imprecise ideas as to the meaning
of the clause, the Court has failed to develop a meaning which has served some useful
purpose. Instead, Rehnquist viewed the Court's use of the fourteenth amendment as only a
threat to legislatures which, in the eyes of the Court, pass illogical or arbitrary laws. Id.
36. See generally Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-47 (1967). During the nation's first
century, Congress relied on state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Consti-
tution. But with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and subsequent legislation,
federal courts became the primary tribunals to redress the deprivation of such rights. See also
H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) (discusses the historical
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jority that the Court was not a council of revision and was not given
power to veto a state law merely because it was felt to be somewhat
contrary to the Court's concept of the public interest."
In enforcing the generalities of the fourteenth amendment,
Rehnquist believed the majority had succumbed to the temptation
to hold any law containing imperfections to be a denial of equal
protection.38 The Court in the past had taken the fourteenth amend-
ment out of the context of the Civil War and extended it beyond the
protection of race, 9 to other areas of discrimination, such as na-
tional origin, 0 and now to illegitimacy. With this extension, the
Court became confused as to what sort of scrutiny was applicable
to statutory classifications based on illegitimacy." The majority
determined the proper scrutiny to be an analysis of the relation
between some state "purpose" in enacting the law and the "means"
to carry out that purpose. The dissent pointed out, however, that
the state's "purpose" was to make section 12 a part of Illinois statu-
tory law, a purpose which was accomplished. The dissent thought
the real question the majority was trying to answer was what
"motivated" the legislators to vote for this section: What were they
incidents connected with the proposal and adoption of the fourteenth amendment to ascertain
the purpose of the amendment, the powers intended to be granted to the federal government,
and those powers to be prohibited to the states).
37. 430 U.S. at 778.
38. Id. at 779.
39. Growing out of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was originally held to be
aimed at the protection of blacks. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (four-
teenth amendment was designed to provide and protect for blacks all the civil rights which
whites enjoy). See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (discussing the history and adoption of the fourteenth amendment as
it relates to racial discrimination).
40. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (California Alien Land Law held to deny
American citizen equal protection by discrimination based solely on parent's country of
origin); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (guarantees of fourteenth amendment held
to extend to all persons without regard to differences of race, color, or nationality).
41. In extending the scope of fourteenth amendment equal protection review, the Court
has held that classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect, just as are those based
on race or nationality. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state bar examining committee
rule denying aliens permission to take the bar examination seen as inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (state
statute denying welfare benefits to certain classes of aliens held subject to the close judicial
scrutiny as classifications based on race or nationality). Although illegitimacy has never been
held to be a suspect classification, the courts have suggested that more than minimal scrutiny
is required. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also note 11 supra.
Recent Decisions
trying to accomplish and did the act in question accomplish such a
"purpose"? Such analysis, Rehnquist believed, required the Court
to second-guess a legislative judgment-an area in which the Court
has no expertise.42
Although this was not the first Court to use this type of analysis
in equal protection questions beyond racial discrimination,"
Rehnquist hoped it would be the last." The dissenting opinion
would have held that no statutory classification should be set aside
unless there are no grounds to justify it. Here, where the Illinois
Probate Act was amended to alleviate some of the problems of intes-
tate succession, it was irrelevant under the equal protection clause,
the dissent maintained, that section 12 did not alleviate all the
difficulties. All laws, unless applied to all persons in all places at
all times, inevitably impose sanctions or disabilities on some per-
sons but not all. Still, Rehnquist stated, discriminatory laws can not
violate the fourteenth amendment unless the means employed are
of the type which the drafters of the amendment sought to pro-
hibit. 5
Both opinions were aware of the statutory development of illegiti-
mates' rights and judicial attempts to afford equal protection to
illegitimates within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. At
common law an illegitimate child was considered nullius filius, the
child of no one, and had no rights of inheritance.4" The severity of
this rule led to many statutory changes granting illegitimates some
of the rights denied by common law.4" The practice of the courts,
however, had been to relax the common law disability only to the
42. 430 U.S. at 781-83.
43. See Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (classification must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation).
44. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (legislatures are
presumed to have acted constitutionally, and statutory classifications will not be set aside if
there are grounds conceived to justify them); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it).
45. 430 U.S. at 785-86.
46. The strong belief in the sanctity of marriage, held by the English, is probably responsi-
ble for the development of such severe treatment of the product of immoral relations. How-
ever, the difficulty in proof of paternity and the fear of fraudulent claims against estates of
wealthy land owners has had a substantial impact. See Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 45, 47 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Illegitimacy]. See generally 2 J. KENT,'COMMENTARIES
*212; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 459 (Chitty ed. 1845).
47. See Illegitimacy, supra note 46, at 76-79.
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extent of such legislation."
Then, in 1968, in the landmark case of Levy v. Louisiana," the
Supreme Court greatly expanded the rights of illegitimates by de-
claring a statutory classification based on illegitimacy to be in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The case involved an action on
behalf of five illegitimate children to recover under a Louisiana
statute" for the wrongful death of their mother. Although the state
courts dismissed the action claiming the word "child," as used in
the statute, meant only "legitimate child," the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the discrimination was invidious and violated
the equal protection clause. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child bore no relation to the nature of the wrong inflicted on the
mother and, therefore, the illegitimate children could not be denied
rights which other citizens enjoyed."
After Levy, the rights of illegitimates began to receive strong sup-
port in many jurisdictions." But in the 1971 case of Labine v.
Vincent,53 the Supreme Court severely restricted this trend by refus-
ing to extend the Levy rationale into the area of intestate succes-
sion. In Labine, the guardian of an illegitimate child attacked the
constitutionality of Louisiana laws which barred illegitimate chil-
dren from sharing equally with legitimate children in the estate of
an intestate father.54 The Supreme Court upheld the discriminatory
48. See Annot., 41 L. Ed. 2d 1228 (1975).
49. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73,
76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1967) provides the right to recover damages
for wrongful death in favor of the surviving spouse, child, or children.
51. 391 U.S. at 70-72.
52. By 1971, eighteen states permitted illegitimate children who had been acknowledged
to inherit from their fathers. See 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 428, 440 n.95 (1971).
53. 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (5-4 decision).
54. The trial court dismissed the petition to declare the illegitimate child the sole heir to
his father's estate and held that under Louisiana law, legitimate collateral heirs take the
property to the exclusion of illegitimate children. Louisiana has carefully regulated many
property rights and as a result, a complex statutory scheme of intestate succession has
developed. Although legitimate children have an automatic right to inherit from their par-
ents, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (West 1952), illegitimate children who are never acknowl-
edged have no right to share in the estate of an intestate father and, in some instances, their
father may not even bequeath the property to them by will. Id. art. 1488. Illegitimate children
acknowledged by their fathers are considered "natural children" and have some right to take
by intestate succession but only to the exclusion of the state. Id. art. 919. However, illegiti-
mate children who are legitimated or adopted may take as any other child. Id. art. 1486.




classifications as being within the state's power to make laws re-
garding the disposition of property. There is no right to inherit
guaranteed by the Constitution and as a result, the regulation of
property disposition has traditionally been left to the states.55 Even
though the laws may be rigid, they are the deliberate and planned
choices of the state legislators which, according to the Labine Court,
the vague generalities of the fourteenth amendment do not empower
the Court to nullify.5" Any reliance on Levy, the Court held, was
misplaced in that Levy did not say a state could never treat an
illegitimate child different from a legitimate one.57 Unjust results
are inherent in succession laws as they also tend to discriminate
against collateral over ascendant heirs and ascendants over descen-
dents. But such unjust results are not necessarily constitutional
defects.58 Further, in Levy the state statute had created an
"insurmountable barrier" to the illegitimate child. Under the intes-
tate statutes in Labine, however, the father could legitimate the
child or, in some cases, write a will if he wished the child to share
in the estate. Thus, the Labine Court refused to extend Levy into
the area of intestate succession59 and declined to overturn a state's
choice of laws simply because there were better or more rational
alternatives.0
The question presented in Trimble appears to be indistin-
guishable from the issue in Labine, and Labine might properly have
been dispositive of the issue here. However, to rely solely on Labine,
would be to ignore the substantial differences between the Louis-
iana statutory scheme in Labine and the Illinois scheme.6 The
Louisiana statute did not completely exclude any child from receiv-
ing benefits. 2 Although illegitimates were divided into two classes,
bastards and natural, each were granted limited rights of support. 3
55. Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 450 (1943) (privileges conferred
to administrator of an estate by federal bankruptcy act did not override state prohibitions
since distribution of estates is matter of state law with which Congress has refrained from
interfering).
56. 401 U.S. at 540.
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 537-38.
59. Id. at 539.
60. Id. at 537.
61. See Brief for Appellant at 7, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (emphasizes the
substantive differences between the statutory schemes) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appel-
lanti.
62. See note 54 supra.
63. Id. See also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1488 (West 1952) which reads in part: "Natural
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Illinois, however, had no such scheme. 4 The Illinois Probate Act was
totally discriminatory between legitimates and illegitimates. There
was no provision allowing any illegitimate child the right of support
from the estate of the deceased father. In other words, the Illinois
statute was not attuned to alternative considerations. Only if the
child were made legitimate by both intermarriage and acknowledge-
ment could the child share in the father's estate by intestate succes-
sion. Thus, an application of Labine was unwarranted since Labine
was limited by its facts and the unusual Louisiana statutory
scheme. 5
Further, by its reliance on Labine, the dissent implied that the
Court can not, or should not, review intestate succession laws in
terms of the fourteenth amendment.66 Although the Supreme Court
has never before declared an intestacy statute unconstitutional,67
one of the purposes of judicial review has always been to insure that
statutes serve legitimate state purposes without conflicting with the
state's duty under the fourteenth amendment to provide equal pro-
tection to all citizens. 8 Undoubtedly, states have the power to make
laws regarding the disposition of property, but when these laws run
afoul of a basic right guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court may
interfere with state regulatory power, even in areas traditionally
reserved to the states. 9 Where the statute appears to invidiously
discriminate, the test for validity has been whether the line drawn
was a rational one.7" While the courts can not prevent social oppro-
brium, they may strike down discriminatory laws where there is no
justifiable state interest7' or where there is no rational relationship
fathers and mothers can, in no case, dispose of property in favor of their adulterine or
incestuous children, unless to the mere amount of what is necessary to their sustenance, or
to procure them in an occupation or profession by which to support themselves."
64. See note 3 supra.
65. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 61, at 7 (alleging error in the court's reliance upon
Labine as a valid precedent).
66. See 49 TEx. L. REv. 1132, 1134 (1971) (emphasizing that the Court has continually
followed a long line of precedents in holding that inheritance laws are exclusively state
matters).
67. Id. at 1135.
68. See 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 428, 432 (1971).
69. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (judicial inquiry under equal protec-
tion clause extends to racial classifications in Florida cohabitation law where normally wide
legislative discretion is allowed).
70. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
71. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (equal protection clause is violated




between the discrimination and the achievement of that interest."
Here is where the Labine decision failed. Although the Court pro-
perly declared that the state has the power to discriminate, the
decision failed to analyze the statutory classification to determine
whether there was some reasonable basis for the discrimination
which was rationally aimed at the purpose sought to be achieved.73
It was this additional analysis which properly led the Court in
Trimble to find section 12 a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment.7"
There has been much controversy, however, as to what standard
of scrutiny should be used by the Court in reviewing the reasonable-
ness of statutory classifications based on illegitimacy.75 Although
most statutes are usually subjected to only minimal scrutiny, strict
scrutiny has been required for statutes bearing classifications based
on race76 or nationality . The real question before the Trimble Court
should have been whether the strict scrutiny test should be ex-
tended to the area of illegitimacy. The Labine analysis adopted by
the dissent suggested an unusual standard by implying that the
power of states to regulate such matters exempts the classification
from even minimal scrutiny.78 The majority in Trimble, although
going beyond the "toothless" analysis in Labine, declined to apply
the strict scrutiny test, holding that illegitimacy was not an inher-
ently "suspect" classification such as race or nationality.79 Such a
test was unnecessary in Trimble to find the statute unconstitu-
tional, but for further clarification and as a guide to state courts,
the strict standard may have been appropriate.
Recent decisions in cases of discrimination against illegitimates
72. See id.; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
73. See 49 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1137 (1971) (although reasonable justifications can and do
exist for discriminating against illegitimates, the goals of family protection and orderly prop-
erty disposition were not served by the unnecessarily broad statute).
74. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
75. Compare Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) with Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
76. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (equal protection clause demands that
miscegenation statute based solely on racial classification be subjected to the most rigid
scrutiny).
77. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (Alien Land Law classifications
based on nationality held unconstitutional in absence of compelling justification).
78. See 430 U.S. at 777.
79. Id. at 767. See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); note 12 supra.
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have attributed to such children all the characteristics of other sus-
pect classes."s Illegitimacy, just as race or nationality, attaches at
birth and is not within control of the individual. Even though per-
sonal attributes are unaffected by illegitimacy, the status has al-
ways been stigmatized by society. The effect of this societal discrim-
ination has been to deprive innocent children of an equal opportun-
ity to develop both intellectually and emotionally.8 Such deficien-
cies tend to increase with age as a result of the child's increasing
awareness of his "inferior" status. Thus, to insure an equal oppor-
tunity to develop, all classifications of illegitimacy should be re-
garded as suspect."2
Even without the application of the strict scrutiny test, the
Trimble Court was able to find the classification discriminatory.
Such a result, however, should not be viewed as a complete abroga-
tion of all statutory classifications based on illegitimacy. Although
it is now well established that the equal protection clause may pre-
clude forms of state discrimination against illegitimate children, the
flaw may lie only within the broadness of the particular statutory
scheme and its failure to provide a middle alternative between com-
plete statutory disinheritance and a case by case approach. Thus,
any future decision would be limited by the facts of the case. At the
very least, there must be some rational relationship between the
classification and the state purposes sought to be achieved. But the
skill of the legislators in avoiding broad discriminatory practices
and providing at least for those categories of illegitimate children
whose rights would not adversely affect state interests will be deter-
minative.
Lauren Revoldt Fertelmes
80. 427 U.S. at 505.
81. Studies show that illegitimate children have a lower "IQ" than legitimate children of
the same race and economic status. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 61, at 23.
82. The Supreme Court declined to hold the classification to be "suspect" because the
roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather than the child and because
illegitimacy does not carry an "obvious badge," as does race or sex. See Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. at 505-06.
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